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The purpose of this paper is to present a recently emerging evolutionary approach to the study of human organization 
that I will refer to as ‘naturalistic’, and to highlight its integrative potential for the social and administrative sciences. 
This naturalistic approach considers the various forms of human cooperation as products of gene-culture co-
evolutionary processes, and in doing so goes to the heart of the collective action problems that are central to explaining 
the human condition. Moreover, in building empirically grounded explanations of human behavior and organization, it 
also offers an alternative to the traditional view of governance in economic theory, with its emphasis on decentralized 
exchange and rational self-interested choice. The naturalistic approach both explains why human nature has evolved to 
the point where we often can do ‘better than rational’ in the face of the social dilemmas underlying collective action 
problems, and why modern forms of social, economic, and political organization are nevertheless always prone to being 
undermined by these same dilemmas. 
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“Economic transactions take place not only in markets, but also within firms, associations, 
households, and agencies. Whereas economic theory has comprehensively illuminated the virtues 
and limitations of markets, it has traditionally paid less attention to other institutional 
arrangements.” (From the press release announcing The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009)i  
“While no full-blown theory of collective action yet exists, evolutionary theories appear most 
able to explain the diverse findings from the lab and the field and to carry the nucleus of an 
overarching theory.” (Ostrom, 2000: 138) 
1. Introduction
Much to the surprise of many economists, in 2009 political scientist Elinor Ostrom earned a 
Nobel Prize in economics for helping bring “economic governance research from the fringe to the 
forefront of scientific attention”.ii By awarding her this prize, the Economic Sciences Prize 
Committee recognized Ostrom’s work as a fundamental contribution to ‘institutional economics’: 
the analysis of the ‘sets of rules that govern human interaction’. Both her work on governing the 
commons and that of her co-recipient economist Oliver Williamson on transaction cost 
economics, were seen as addressing “head-on the challenges posed by the 1991 Laureate in 
Economic Sciences, Ronald Coase … [w]hat exactly do organizations such as firms and 
associations accomplish that cannot be better accomplished in markets?”  
In this paper I argue that this fundamental question is best answered from what I will refer 
to as a ‘naturalistic’ perspective, that is, by considering human behavior and organization as the 
result of gene-culture co-evolutionary processes (cf. Stoelhorst & Richerson, 2013). I believe this 
perspective is in line with Ostrom’s general outlook on economic governance (cf. Wilson, Ostrom 
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& Cox, 2013). As the quote from her work at the beginning of this paper testifies, she saw 
evolutionary theory as the most promising candidate for the development of a general theory of 
collective action. By awarding her the Nobel, the Economic Sciences Prize Committee put 
Ostrom’s work squarely in a long, if quite diverse, tradition of institutional analysis in economics 
that includes the early 20th century American Institutionalism of Veblen and Commons, the New 
Institutionalism of Coase, Williamson and North, as well as more recent evolutionary game 
theoretic work (for recent reviews of these three traditions, see, respectively, Hodgson & 
Stoelhorst, 2014; Menard & Shirley, 2014; Hodgson & Huang, 2012). Ostrom’s work can thus be 
seen as bridging the interests of political and administrative scientists (the main audience of this 
journal) and economics research on institutional complexity and evolution (the topic of this 
special issue). But in addition to this, her work also links in with a recent interdisciplinary stream 
of research at the intersection of biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics that 
studies human cooperation by combining gene-culture co-evolutionary arguments with a multi-
level selection perspective (e.g. Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Haidt, 2012; Nowak, 2011; Wilson, 2012). 
The main purpose of this paper is to show the relevance of this latter stream of research for 
institutional analysis and design. 
As this stream of research is still somewhat fragmented, my first goal is to bring together 
what I consider to be its main insights into human behavior and organization, and to articulate 
the naturalistic perspective on economic governance that these insights suggest. My second goal 
is to detail how this naturalistic perspective differs from the traditional view of governance in 
economic theory, with its emphasis on rational choice, self-interest, and arm’s length market 
transactions as the key to economic welfare (cf. Gowdy et al., 2013).iii While the fact that the 
naturalistic perspective takes us away from some cherished notions in traditional economic theory 
may make it a relatively difficult ‘sell’ to many economists and political scientists, it has the 
important advantage that it is consistent with the empirical evidence on actual human behavior 
and organization from both the lab and the field. In particular, a naturalistic perspective explains 
how evolved behavioral dispositions allow humans to often do ‘better than rational’ (Ostrom, 
1998) in the face of the social dilemma’s underlying collective action problems. In doing so, it also 
suggests a very specific answer to Coase’s question as posed by the Nobel Prize committee: what 
‘firms, associations, households, and agencies’ accomplish that cannot better be accomplished in 
markets is to help us create economic welfare by triggering evolved behavioral dispositions that 
allow us to overcome our short-term self-interest.  
To substantiate this answer to Coase’s question, I will below first articulate a redefinition of 
the problem of economic governance as it has traditionally featured in economic theory. In 
particular, I will argue that the social dilemmas underlying collective action problems are much 
more central than most economic theory assumes, because they do not only affect the provision of 
public but also of private goods. At the same time, I will also argue that their solution is less 
problematic than typically thought, because of differences between the behaviors of the stylized 
Homo economicus featuring in traditional economic models and actual Homo sapiens. I will 
subsequently ground these claims in insights into the nature of human cooperation from 
evolutionary theory. I will argue that the main problem in sustaining human cooperation is not 
our alleged self-interest, but the evolutionary mismatch between our evolved moral and social 
psychology, on one hand, and the scale of modern human organization, on the other. More 
specifically, the main problem of human cooperation is not to have rational self-interested agents 
play ‘cooperate’ in social dilemmas. It is rather to design institutions that trigger evolved 
behavioral dispositions that put bounds on pursuing our short term self-interest, even if these 
dispositions originally evolved to sustain cooperation on a much smaller scale. 
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2. The Problem of Economic Governance Redefined 
From Adam Smith, via Walras and the marginal revolution, to general equilibrium models 
and welfare economics,  the canonical view of human cooperation in economic theory is of the 
‘Invisible Hand’ of the market guiding the actions of self-interested agents towards an outcome 
that maximizes the collective interest. This view models markets as perfectly decentralized 
systems that consist of rational agents interacting through arm’s-length competitive exchanges 
(Demsetz, 1988). One of its undeniable attractions is that it posits a system that will maximize 
collective welfare on the basis of an automatic, bottom-up, self-organizing process – and that it 
does so despite the self-interested nature of its constituent agents.iv The policy implications are 
clear: to maximize economic welfare, institutions should facilitate decentralized exchange, for 
instance through enforcing individual property rights and promoting free markets. 
One of the problems with this view on economic governance was recognized relatively early 
on: markets will not be able to coordinate the actions of rational self-interested agents to provide 
public goods (Samuelson, 1954). In contrast to private goods, which are competitive and 
(assuming institutions that effectively enforce property rights) excludable, public goods are non-
competitive and non-excludable. Given these characteristics, a rational self-interested agent will 
recognize that the optimal course of action is to free-ride on the contributions of others, which 
means that a decentralized system will not be able to provide public goods. In other words, for as 
far as economic welfare also depends on the provision of public goods, a decentralized system of 
self-interested rational agents will not maximize social welfare. This is particularly troubling 
because securing property rights, a precondition for perfect decentralization to work, is itself a 
public good. 
The solution to the provision of public goods proposed in economic theory is perfect 
centralization, the provision of the public good by a central authority that imposes a tax on the 
individual agents in the system to provide the public good. In combination with perfect 
decentralization, the idea of perfect centralization defines the ‘two goods, two systems’ view of 
economic governance that forms the theoretical backdrop against which Ostrom’s Nobel Prize in 
economics can be understood (see Figure 1).  
Public goods 
(centralization)      
Private goods 
(decentralization) 
Figure 1: The traditional two goods, two systems view 
As Ostrom explained, an important part of her contribution to our understanding of 
economic governance was to demonstrate that this ‘two goods, two systems’ view is too limited 
(Ostrom, 2010). There are not two but four types of goods, and, as scholars in public 
administration have long realized, the provision of these additional goods typically involves 
‘polycentric’ governance rather than perfect (de)centralization, which is to say that a diverse array 
of public and private agencies is involved in providing them (see Figure 2). 
Subtractability 
High Low 
Excludability 
Low CPRs Public goods 
High Private goods Toll goods 
Figure 2:  From two to four goods, after Ostrom (2010)  
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What Figure 2 does not capture is that the problem with the ‘two goods, two systems’ view of 
economic governance runs much deeper. Figure 2 could be interpreted as proposing that 
economic governance involves perfectly decentralized markets for the provision of private goods, 
perfect centralization for the provision of public goods, and polycentric solutions for the provision 
of common pool resources and toll goods.v But a more realistic picture of economic governance 
would dispense with perfect centralization and perfect decentralization altogether. First, consider 
the notion of perfect decentralization as the way to provide private goods. Perfect decentralization 
assumes that individual agents only interact through arm’s-length market transactions. But this is 
not how most private goods are provided: firms play a central role in this process and they are 
themselves solutions to a collective action problem that has been referred to as ‘team production’ 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).vi In other words, in contrast to the unitary agent view of firms in 
traditional economic models, firms are in fact cooperative entities consisting of multiple agents 
with conflicting interests. Second, consider the notion of perfect centralization as the way to 
provide public goods. Perfect centralization assumes a single benevolent, omniscient, and 
omnipotent central agent.vii But, again, this is not how government works. Governments are 
collections of agencies whose existence and interplay throw up collective action problems of their 
own. 
Figure 3: A naturalistic view (concepts of perfect (de)centralization are useful theoretical benchmarks, but the provision of all 
goods involves social dilemmas, which are solved in the polycentric context of households, firms, associations, and agencies) 
The actual landscape of economic governance is more like Figure 3. This figure explicitly 
captures the fact that perfect centralization and decentralization are merely useful theoretical 
abstractions, and that all economic governance is a matter of polycentric solutions to collective 
action problems at different levels of analysis. In reality there is no such thing as perfect 
centralization or perfect decentralization. ‘Households, firms, associations and agencies’ are all 
manifestations of solutions to collective action problems. In other words, it is not just that the 
actual landscape of economic governance is more complicated than the picture painted in the ‘two 
goods, two systems’ view. The problem is rather that this view fundamentally misrepresents that 
landscape. Economic welfare is not the result of competition among individual agents facilitated 
by a benevolent designer imposing the rules of competition from above. Economic welfare is the 
result of bottom-up interactions among agents that allow them to reap the benefits of cooperation 
by forming functional groups. It is not that competition does not play an important role in this 
process, but not all of this competition is guided by markets. Moreover, when it is, competition is 
mostly between groups of individuals such as firms, which first need to solve the social dilemma 
Perfect centralization 
Perfect decentralization 
Agencies 
Associations 
Households 
Firms 
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Special Issue: Complexity, Innovation and Policy (2017) 7-21
J.W. Stoelhorst: Better Than Rational A Naturalistic View Of Economic Governance 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-39 11 
University of Bamberg Press 
of team production to have products or services to compete with at all. In other words, whether it 
is the provision of private goods by firms (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), the provision of public 
goods (Samuelson 1948) and club goods (Buchanan, 1965), or the governance of common pool 
resources (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990), in all cases the central problem of economic governance is 
to overcome social dilemmas.viii 
3. The Ultimate Explanation of Human Cooperation 
How humans are able to overcome social dilemmas is exactly the question that is at the core 
of the naturalistic perspective on human behavior and organization that is emerging at the 
intersection of the natural and social sciences (Stoelhorst & Richerson, 2013). In the context of 
evolutionary theory, cooperation in general, let alone the unique nature of human cooperation, 
poses a fundamental problem for reasons that are similar to why it is a problem for economic 
theory. In fact, the traditional emphasis on decentralized competitive exchange among rational 
self-interested agents in economics (i.e. the role of markets in coordinating human action) reflects 
the baseline model of biological evolution as a process driven by competition for scarce resources 
among individual organisms: the Darwinian variation-selection-retention algorithm underlying 
biological evolution can only reward behaviors that are in individual organisms’ self-interest (i.e., 
allowing them to pass on more of their genes to future generations). Given this algorithm, how 
can cooperative behaviors evolve at all?  
In answering this question, evolutionary theory makes an important distinction between 
ultimate and proximate explanations (Mayr, 1961). A proximate explanation accounts for behaviors 
in mechanistic terms and explains how behaviors come about. For instance, a proximate 
explanation of cooperative behaviors in public good games may invoke strong reciprocity – the 
tendency of human agents to reward cooperative behaviors and punish uncooperative behaviors, 
even when doing so comes at a personal cost (Fehr & Gintis, 2007). Such a proximate explanation 
needs to be complemented by an ultimate explanation that accounts for why behaviors such as 
strong reciprocity, which are at odds with rational self-interest, may have evolved. An ultimate 
explanation explains behaviors in functional terms: it shows how particular behaviors can increase 
an individual organism’s fitness. Over the last 50 years, evolutionary theory has identified five 
mechanisms that can explain the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006): kin selection, or 
inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964), direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984), indirect 
reciprocity (e.g. Alexander, 1987), network reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) and group selection, 
or multi-level selection theory (e.g. Sober & Wilson, 1998).ix 
All five mechanisms are likely to have played a role in the evolution of the human ability to 
cooperate, but the crux of the ultimate explanation of human cooperation seems to lie in a 
combination of multi-level selection (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Wilson, 2007) and gene-
culture co-evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). What makes humans 
unique is that we can sustain very large-scale cooperation among non-kin. This empirical fact 
rules out explanations in terms of kin selection or reciprocity alone. Kin selection cannot explain 
that human cooperation extends to individuals that are not genetically related. Direct reciprocity 
cannot explain the large scale of human cooperation, because cooperation based on reciprocity 
quickly breaks down when group size increases (Boyd & Richerson, 1988). Even indirect 
reciprocity fails in the face of the empirical evidence about human cooperative behaviors, because 
humans even display cooperative behaviors in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers 
without reputation effects (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
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To explain such behaviors, we need to turn to multi-level selection theory, in which groups as 
well as individuals are units of selection (cf. Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Wilson, 2007). This 
theory recognizes that individual organisms are often organized in larger functional groups. 
Whenever this is the case, we need to distinguish the selection pressures from within-group 
competition for scarce resources, which favor behavior that is beneficial to the individual, on the 
one hand, and selection pressures from between-group competition for scarce resources, which 
favor behavior that is beneficial to the group, on the other hand. Note that this distinction mirrors 
the structure of a social dilemma, where free-riding is the behavior that is beneficial to the 
individual, and cooperating the behavior that is beneficial to the group. The crux of multi-level 
selection theory is that whenever individuals are organized into groups that compete with each 
other, the net selection effect of within-group competition and between-group competition may 
actually favor genes that code for within-group cooperative behaviors.  
Although the evolution of cooperation on the basis of multi-level selection acting on genetic 
evolution alone is possible (Sober & Wilson, 1998), the explanatory value of the multi-level 
selection framework is much increased if, in addition to genetic mechanisms, we allow cultural 
mechanisms to play a role as well (e.g. Bell et al., 2009; Henrich, 2004). Doing so leads to the 
following explanation of the origins of the unique human ability to cooperate (cf. Bowles & Gintis, 
2003; Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). In the between-group competition for scarce 
resources among our tribal ancestors it was not only the genes of the individuals within the group 
that were selected for, but also their culturally transmitted ideas and behaviors. Ceteris paribus, 
groups that evolved cultures that supported cooperation could out-compete other groups, and 
cultures that favored cooperation spread. Moreover, these cultures changed within-group selection 
pressures to favor genes that predispose humans to cooperative behaviors. As a result, humans 
are a highly group-selected species: over evolutionary history we became social animals with 
moral instincts conducive to solving social dilemmas and sustaining cooperation among non-kin. 
4. Proximate Explanations of Human Cooperation 
If, as the naturalistic view asserts, we are a moral rather than a purely self-interested species, 
then how do our moral instincts manifest themselves? They do, for instance, in a host of findings 
in behavioral economics and social psychology demonstrating that humans facing social dilemma 
games do not, on average, behave as theories of rational self-interested choice would predict (see 
Van Lange et al., 2013 and Van Lange et al, 2014 for reviews). One specific example of this is the 
finding already mentioned above, that in public good games many people play as ‘strong 
reciprocators’ rather than as ‘rational self-interested agents’: they reward others’ cooperative 
behaviors and punish others’ uncooperative behaviors, even if this comes at a personal cost (Fehr 
& Gintis, 2007).x Strong reciprocity is clearly at odds with maximizing self-interest and is 
especially relevant for our understanding of economic governance because it occurs in the context 
of a game that mirrors the basic pay-off structure of team production, common pool resource 
management, and the provision of public goods. 
The most likely ultimate explanation for such seemingly irrational behavior is the 
combination of multi-level selection and gene-culture evolution summarized above. In fact, it has 
been argued that most, if not all, of our social and moral psychology has evolved to help us sustain 
norms that facilitate within-group cooperation in the context of between-group competition 
(Greene 2013; Haidt 2012; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). On this view, our social behaviors are the 
result of adaptations that originally emerged to sustain cooperation in the small-scale societies in 
which our ancestors lived for most of human evolutionary history. These behaviors not only 
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include strong reciprocity (related to maintaining within-group cooperation), but, for instance, 
also gossiping (related to cheater detection and reputational mechanisms) and in-group favoritism 
and out-group aggression (related to between-group competition) (Haidt, 2012; Greene, 2013). 
The proximate explanations of such behaviors, in turn, are the neural mechanisms causing the 
emotions that trigger and reinforce these behaviors (Fehr & Camerer, 2007). Examples of this are 
guilt and shame (related to observing group norms oneself), anger and contempt (related to 
punishing others that do not observe group norms), and feelings of reward when punishing non-
cooperators (Greene, 2013). 
Thus, while the ultimate function of our moral psychology is to help us overcome social 
dilemmas, the proximate effect is to put bounds on the pursuit of our self-interest. Theories of the 
nature of these bounds invoke other-regarding preferences (meaning that individuals do not just 
care about their own outcomes but also about the outcomes for others) and preferences for 
fairness (such as reciprocal fairness and inequity aversion).xi What these explanations have in 
common is that they posit internal pressures that can be thought of as changing the pay-off matrix 
that a rational self-interested player would perceive to one in which cooperation actually becomes 
the ‘rational’ strategy (Van Lange et al., 2014). Homo sapiens does not play like Homo economicus
because we have the ability to internalize moral norms that make us ‘better than rational’ at 
solving social dilemmas. Moreover, our psychology is rich in neural mechanisms that trigger 
various emotions that make us behave in ways that help us reinforce these norms.  
While it is, therefore, not the case that the actual behaviors of Homo sapiens correspond to 
our Homo economicus typecasting in traditional economic theory, neither is it the case that our 
behaviors correspond to a view of our species as Homo sociologicus, whose internalized norms 
always lead to norm-regarding behavior (Fehr & Gintis, 2007). For instance, results from public 
good games show that 30% of subjects do not contribute to the public good and free-ride on the 
contributions of others, while 50% of subjects cooperate conditionally, meaning that they 
contribute to the public good as long as others are doing so (Fischbacher, et al., 2001). In other 
words, a substantial minority of individuals does in fact behave in line with the assumptions of 
standard economic theory, at least in the context of the anonymous interactions of lab 
experiments with public goods. But the majority of individuals does not, and, crucially, given the 
opportunity to punish free riders, even if this punishment is costly and even in the context of 
anonymous interactions, it is the majority’s tendency to cooperate that prevails (e.g. Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000).   
A suggestion that may offer an additional key to the proximate explanation of these results is 
that human behavior may be guided by two competing neural pathways (cf. Boone, et al., 2008; 
Declerck, et al., 2013) that we could label ‘strategic’ and ‘moralistic’.  While the two pathways can 
be active in parallel, one of the two will ultimately dominate and inform actual behavior. The 
strategic pathway is more likely to result in self-interested behaviors, while the moralistic pathway 
is needed for the regulation of social relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011) and is more likely to trigger 
positive and negative reciprocity. If this is indeed how the human mind works, it raises 
interesting questions about how environmental cues may contribute to the dominance of one or 
the other pathway, and thus trigger different individual behaviors and, ultimately, collective 
outcomes. For instance, the finding that labeling a prisoners dilemma game ‘The Community 
Game’ or ‘The Wall Street Game’ affects cooperation, with significantly higher cooperation in the 
community game (Liberman, et al., 2004), seems to be consistent with this. Findings like this are 
particularly rich in implications for the administrative sciences, because they suggest that 
institutions may affect the level of cooperation in social dilemmas by triggering different neural 
pathways.xii 
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5. A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance 
What do the arguments above mean for economic governance? The first three rows of Table 
1 summarize the main points made so far, namely that social dilemmas are both more central to 
economic governance and less problematic to solve than traditional economic theory has 
assumed. They are more central because economic welfare crucially depends on solving collective 
action problems, even in the provision of private goods. Most private goods require firms to 
produce, and the viability of firms depends on agents solving team production problems. At the 
same time, social dilemmas are less problematic to solve than traditional economic theory 
assumes, because for all of human evolutionary history our biological and economic success has 
depended on solving collective action problems like team production. As a result, human 
psychology has evolved in ways that help us overcome the social dilemmas that emerge when our 
individual interest in within-group competition diverges from the collective interest in between-
group competition. 
Traditional view Naturalistic view 
Main cause of welfare Arm’s length exchange 
(Independent action) 
Collective action 
(Mutual dependence) 
Nature of competition Single-level selection 
(Competition between 
individuals) 
Multi-level selection 
(Competition between 
individuals and groups) 
Behavioral assumption Self-interest Bounded self-interest 
The function of institutions To facilitate decentralized 
exchange among self-
interested agents 
To help boundedly self-
interested agents overcome 
social dilemmas 
What institutions are Single rule complexes 
imposed top-down 
Competing rule complexes 
evolving bottom-up 
What undermines institutions Self-interest Evolutionary mismatch 
Policy focus  Secure property rights and 
provide other public goods 
Keep competition peaceful and 
leaders honest 
Table 1: A comparison of the traditional and naturalistic views of economic governance 
Note that the claim that social dilemmas are less problematic than traditional economic 
theory assumes does not mean that they are unproblematic. In fact, the crux of multi-level 
selection theory is that it acknowledges the tension between individual and group interest, 
meaning that functional groups are always vulnerable to being undermined by self-interested 
behavior (Campbell, 1994). Nevertheless, a naturalistic view on human behavior and organization 
does suggest a fundamental redefinition of the problem of social dilemmas in economic 
governance: the problem of economic governance is not how to get self-interested agents (Homo 
economicus) to play cooperate in the face of social dilemmas, but how to get boundedly self-
interested human beings (Homo sapiens) to do so. 
This is where the role of institutions comes in, as summarized in the last four rows of Table 
1. The purpose of institutions is not primarily to facilitate competition among individual self-
interested agents, but to help boundedly self-interest humans overcome social dilemmas. 
Institutions, be they formal or informal, achieve this through the ‘rules of the game’ they impose 
on us. These rules work in one of two ways (alone or in combination): by triggering the bounds on 
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our self-interest that change the pay-off matrix from within (i.e., by appealing to our moral 
sentiments), and/or by changing the pay-off matrix from without (i.e., by some form of 
punishment). In contrast to traditional economic theory, when considering the latter mechanism 
there is no presumption of a benevolent designer that can impose a set of rules from the top down. 
Rules complexes rather evolve from the bottom up, as the result of competition between 
individuals and, at higher levels of analysis, competition between groups. One immediate 
implication of this is the explicit recognition that institutions are politically contested, and that the 
rules they impose are historically and culturally specific phenomena that may favor the interests 
of particular subgroups.  
Another implication of a naturalistic view of institutions is that it points in a fundamentally 
different direction when it comes to the problem at the core of designing effective institutions. 
This problem is not so much humanity’s presumed self-interest, but ‘evolutionary mismatch’. 
The idea of evolutionary mismatch is that while our social and moral psychology evolved in ways 
that help us overcome our short-term self-interest, this psychology is the result of solving social 
dilemmas in the small-scale societies in which our evolutionary ancestors lived. As a species we 
are particularly good at solving social dilemmas in the context of relatively small groups where 
face-to-face contact, reputation effects, and group identities allow for ways to discipline possible 
free riders. But our psychology is not necessarily particularly well-adapted to the large-scale, 
complex societies with their often anonymous interactions in which we live today. In the popular 
rendition of this core idea of evolutionary psychology, we are constructing our modern worlds on 
the back of ‘Stone Age minds’ – and the two do not always match. 
Two problems, in particular, stand out as obvious effects of evolutionary mismatch. The first 
is the problem of keeping competition, and particularly between-group competition, peaceful. 
Because our psychology evolved in the context of between-group competition, our cooperative 
tendencies tend to be much stronger for in-group members, and, in fact, often go hand-in-hand 
with outright aggression to out-group members (Greene, 2013). The second is the problem of 
keeping leaders honest. While our evolutionary ancestors were very successful in maintaining 
egalitarian societies (Boehm, 1993), this has changed dramatically since, some 10.000 years ago, 
the Agricultural Revolution started the process of increasing the scale of our societies. One of the 
defining features of the tribal cultures with which our psychologies co-evolved was that they were 
very effective in keeping in check those who would want to emulate the ‘alfa male’ behaviors of 
many other primate species (Boehm, 1993). The fact that the increasing scale of our societies went 
hand-in-hand with an increasing stratification turned this feature of human societies on its head. 
These two manifestations of evolutionary mismatch, out-group aggression and the tension 
between our evolved egalitarian preferences and the tendency towards inequality in large-scale 
societies, present themselves as even more fundamental issues for institutions to solve than 
providing public goods such as property rights. Attempts to provide public goods can at least 
appeal to aspects of our psychologies that specifically evolved to help us solve the social dilemmas 
involved. But in the case of the two evolutionary mismatch problems, our evolved psychologies are 
actually the root cause of the problem. 
6. Implications for the Administrative Sciences 
What does the emerging naturalistic view on human behavior and organization mean for the 
administrative sciences? Two interrelated claims have been made about the potential value of the 
naturalistic view, and both are especially relevant for the administrative sciences, which are by 
nature interdisciplinary and applied. The first claim relates to the interdisciplinary nature of the 
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administrative sciences, and is that a naturalistic view offers an integrative paradigm for the social 
sciences (e.g. Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Fowler & Schreiber, 2008; Gintis, 2006; Mesoudi, Whiten & 
Laland, 2006; Stoelhorst & Richerson, 2013; Wilson and Gowdy, 2013). For instance, Gintis (2007: 
1) argues that a naturalistic view offers the “analytical and empirical bases to construct the 
framework for an integrated behavioral science” that can reconcile the ‘distinct and incompatible 
ways’ in which the various behavioral and social sciences have modeled human behavior. 
Reconciling incompatible models of human behavior, such as the Homo economicus and Homo 
sociologicus views, is especially important for the coherence of interdisciplinary fields like the 
administrative sciences that build on a variety of behavioral and social sciences and that are 
therefore particularly susceptible to importing conflicting assumptions about human behavior 
into their theories.   
The second claim relates to the applied nature of the administrative sciences, and is that a 
naturalistic view offers a foundation for a ‘science of intentional change’ (Wilson, et al., 2014). 
The basic idea underlying this second claim is that “examples of successfully managed behavioral 
and cultural change at scales ranging from individuals to small groups and large populations” are 
“examples of managing evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity” (Wilson, et al., 2014: 395). 
‘Phenotypic plasticity’ refers to the ability of organisms to respond adaptively to changes in their 
environments during their life time. This ability is particularly well-developed in humans because 
of our capacity for symbolic communication. Wilson et al.’s (2014) claim is that, in addition to our 
genotype, networks of symbolic relations also regulate human behavior.xiii Applying this view to 
the arguments in this paper leads to the suggestion that the applied nature of the administrative 
sciences can be thought of as a concern with understanding how institutions can be intentionally 
designed so that the networks of symbolic relations that they represent facilitate human 
cooperation.   
Some important building blocks for this understanding are brought together in relational 
models theory (Fiske, 1991, 1992). Relational models are models that people use 
(unselfconsciously) “to plan and to generate their own action, to understand, remember, and 
anticipate others’ action, to coordinate the joint production of collective action and institutions, 
and to evaluate their own and others’ actions” (Fiske, 2004: 3). The four relational models are 
Communal Sharing (a relationship of unity, community, and collective identity), Authority 
Ranking (a relationship of hierarchical differences, accompanied by the exercise of command and 
complementary display of deference and respect), Equality Matching (a relationship among equals 
manifested in balanced reciprocity), and Market Pricing (a relationships where people compute 
cost/benefit ratios and pursue their self-interest) (Fiske, 1991). These models are not only 
cognitive schemata, but also comprise needs, motives, evaluative attitudes and judgments, as well 
as emotions, all of which trigger different behaviors in social interactions because they make 
different relational self-representations salient (‘Who am I in relation to the other(s)?’) that are 
associated with different needs and motivations and involve different rules of behavior (‘What is 
appropriate behavior for myself and the other in this social interaction?’) (Fiske, 1991).  
Relational models theory holds that four models suffice to generate the very high diversity in 
social relationships observed in practice (Fiske, 1991). Seen within the broader framework of a 
naturalistic perspective on human behavior, the four relational models may be understood as the 
elemental building blocks that enable and constrain the symbolic relations that, in addition to our 
genotype, govern human behavior. They enable them because of their combinatorial potential and 
flexibility with respect to the specific rules that they allow, but they also constrain them because 
they are the result of deeply ingrained aspects of our evolved social and moral psychology. If this 
is indeed true, then we must evaluate institutions in terms of the specific (combination of) 
relational models that they trigger. And if we want to intentionally guide the evolution of 
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institutions in ways that allow us to create more economic value, then we must ask how triggering 
each of the four relational models will affect individuals’ behaviors in the context of social 
dilemmas.  
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016) is an attempt to answer this question for the case of team 
production. It argues that of the four relational models, Market Pricing, the model that traditional 
economic theory emphasizes as most conducive to furthering our economic welfare, is actually 
the model that is least conducive to solving social dilemmas. In fact, Market Pricing exacerbates
social dilemmas because it appeals to parts of our psychology that are likely to trigger strategic as 
opposed to moralistic reasoning. Whereas the other three models trigger interpersonal identities 
and other-regarding motivations, Market Pricing triggers self-interest. This prediction is borne 
out by a host of empirical findings (e.g. Bowles, 2008). Thus, for as far as our economic welfare 
depends on solving social dilemmas, as a naturalistic perspective on economic governance 
suggests it does, traditional economic theory, with its emphasis on markets, may be pointing the 
administrative sciences in the wrong direction with respect to the types of institutions that we 
should be designing. If our economic welfare fundamentally depends on appealing to the bounds 
on our self-interest, then institutions that make us frame our social relationships in terms of 
Market Pricing would in fact achieve the opposite, and we would do well to design institutions 
that help us frame our social relations more in terms of Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, 
and especially Communal Sharing, because it is these frames, as opposed to Market Pricing, that 
trigger our moral sentiments.  
7. Conclusion 
I hope to have achieved three things. The first is to present the main elements of the 
naturalistic perspective on human behavior and organization that is emerging from work at the 
intersection of the biological and social sciences that is grounded in gene-culture co-evolution and 
multi-level selection. The second is to show that this perspective offers an empirically-grounded 
alternative to the traditional economic research paradigm with its emphasis on decentralized 
exchange among rational self-interested agents as the key to economic welfare. The third is to 
suggest how this alternative paradigm can inform the administrative sciences. 
Social dilemmas are both more central to economic governance and less problematic to solve 
than traditional economic theory has assumed. They are more central because economic welfare 
crucially depends on solving collective action problems – not just because these problems play a 
role in the provision of public goods, but also because they play a role in the provision of most 
private goods, which typically involve team production. Humans solve these collective action 
problems through establishing functional groups like households, firms, associations, and 
agencies. This means that the competitive landscape that drives our economic welfare is 
fundamentally misrepresented if we think of it in terms of single-level competition among 
individual agents, as traditional economic theory does. The actual landscape is one of both within-
group and between-group competition, and has been for all of human evolutionary history. As a 
result of this long history, our psychology includes evolved dispositions that put bounds on our 
self-interest, which help us to overcome the social dilemmas that stand in the way of forming 
functional groups.  
Commenting on Ostrom’s Nobel Prize, economist Paul Romer noted the following: Most 
economists think that they are building cranes that suspend important theoretical structures from 
a base that is firmly grounded in first principles. In fact, they almost always invoke a skyhook, 
some unexplained result without which the entire structure collapses … A typical conclusion [is] 
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Special Issue: Complexity, Innovation and Policy (2017) 7-21
J.W. Stoelhorst: Better Than Rational A Naturalistic View Of Economic Governance 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-39 18 
University of Bamberg Press 
that rules that assign property rights and rules that let people trade lead to good outcomes. What’s 
the skyhook? That people will follow the rules. Why would they respect the property rights of 
someone else? [Economists] may have in mind something like this: police officers will arrest 
people who don’t follow the rules. But this is just another skyhook. Who are these police officers? 
Why do they follow rules? … Economists who have become addicted to skyhooks find it hard to 
even understand what it would mean to make the rules that humans follow the object of scientific 
inquiry. If we fail to explore rules in greater depth, [we] will have little to say about the most 
pressing issues facing humans today …Cheers to the Nobel committee for recognizing work on 
one of the deepest issues in economics. Bravo to the political scientist who showed that she was a 
better economist than the economic imperialists who can’t tell the difference between assuming 
and understanding.xiv 
Cheers and bravo as well for Ostrom’s (2000) early recognition of evolutionary theory’s 
potential to develop an overarching theory to address this fundamental issue. As I hope to have 
shown, there has been substantial progress on developing such a theory since 2000, and as the 
still somewhat disparate findings from research on human cooperation from an evolutionary 
perspective are being brought together we are not just beginning to see the contours of an 
overarching theory, but indeed of an integrative research paradigm for the social sciences.  
Applied to Coase’s question as paraphrased by the Nobel Prize committee, ‘what do organizations 
such as firms and associations accomplish that cannot be better accomplished in markets?,’ this 
paradigm leads to the unambiguous answer that firms and associations, as well as other 
collectives like households and agencies, are vehicles to overcome the social dilemmas underlying 
collective action problems. What they accomplish is to provide contexts that trigger the moralistic 
neural pathways that allow us to sustain cooperative social relations. 
Perhaps even more important than this basic insight is the fact that a naturalistic perspective 
leads to the conclusion that the Coasean question is simply misdirected, or at least misdirecting, 
in presuming the primacy of markets. While evolutionary theory also takes competition as its 
starting point, a naturalistic perspective on human behavior and organization acknowledges that 
competition has long, long ago been complemented with, and in many ways been superseded by, 
cooperative arrangements – and that these cooperative arrangements explain the bulk of our 
economic progress. The landscape of economic governance is one of multi-level competition in 
which organizations dominate markets. It is a landscape that, as Simon (1991) observed, a 
Martian visiting Earth, unaware of reigning economic theory, would no doubt describe as an 
‘organizational economy’ rather than a ‘market economy’. Moreover, economic theory’s 
traditional emphasis on markets over organizations as the key to economic welfare is far from 
neutral. For organizations to function, our institutions need to trigger the moralistic processes 
that put bounds on our self-interest. The logic of markets, by triggering strategic reasoning, does 
the opposite. Thus, a naturalistic view suggests that traditional economic theory may have been 
pointing the administrative sciences in the wrong direction when it comes to designing 
institutions that further our economic welfare. 
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Endnotes 
i http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/press.html 
ii The quotes in this paragraph are either from the press release of the 2009 Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel (see previous footnote) or from the advanced information: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/advanced.html 
iii My focus on economic theory is in line with the topic of this special issue, but comes at the expense of ignoring 
related discourses in the social sciences on institutions (e.g. Hall & Taylor, 1996), evolutionary arguments (e.g. 
Sanderson, 2007) and complexity (e.g. Byrne & Callaghan, 2014).   
iv The other attractions are that it can be modelled relatively easily and that it implies a world in which agents have 
maximum individual freedom.  
v Toll goods are Ostrom’s term for what economists had referred to as ‘club goods’. 
vi The problem of team production occurs when there are complementarities between agents’ inputs in the production 
process, so that the collective output is more than the sum of the individual inputs. Note that this is the case in most 
production. This situation creates a metering problem in the sense that it becomes very costly, or even impossible, to 
assess the marginal contributions of individual agents to the collective output. This creates a social dilemma akin to 
the public good dilemma: as the market can only ‘reward’ the collective output, the individual incentive becomes to 
free ride on the contributions of others (i.e. minimizing one’s own effort while still sharing in the spoils of the 
collective output). Alchian & Demsetz (1972) explain the existence of firms as the result of the need to solve this 
problem. This is a different (and ultimately much more convincing) explanation than the one offered by Coase and, 
by extension, Williamson, Ostrom’s co-recipient of the 2009 Nobel (cf. Demsetz, 1988). Blair and Stout (1999) offer a 
more fully developed team production theory of the modern corporation. 
vii In the words of Sudgen (1986: 3, emphasis in original) “Most modern economic theory describes a world presided 
over by a government (not, significantly, by governments), and sees this world through the government’s eyes. The 
government is supposed to have the responsibility, the will and the power to restructure society in whatever way 
maximizes social welfare; like the US Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue 
whenever the market “fails,” and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and how to do so.” 
viii Van Lange et al. (2014: 8) define social dilemmas as ‘situations in which a non-cooperative course of action is (at 
times) tempting for each individual in that it yields superior (often short-term) outcomes for self, and if all pursue 
this non-cooperative course of action, all are (often in the longer-term) worse off than if all had cooperated’. This 
definition includes Prisoner’s dilemmas, Chicken/Hawk-Dove dilemmas, and Assurance/Trust dilemmas. 
ix All five mechanisms explain how the (long-term) benefits of cooperation in terms of fitness can overcome the (short-
term) costs incurred by the individual displaying the cooperative behavior. In shorthand, kin selection explains 
cooperation in terms of genetic relatedness, direct reciprocity in terms of tit-for-tat, indirect reciprocity in terms of 
reputation mechanisms, network reciprocity in terms of assorting, and multi-level selection in terms the tension 
between within-group selection and between-group selection.  
x For some qualifications of the more extreme interpretations of the work on strong reciprocity, see Hagen & 
Hammerstein (2006) and Guala (2012). 
xi See Fehr & Gintis (2007) and Gintis, et al. (2003) for summaries from the perspective of economic theory, and Van 
Lange, et al. (2013) for summaries from the perspective of social psychology. 
xii These findings also begin to address some of the reservations of Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) about current 
interpretations of positive and negative reciprocity in experimental games. 
xiii Wilson et al. (2014: 400) refer to networks of symbolic relations as ‘symbotypes’, which they describe as ‘tacit systems 
of higher-order relations’ that become independent of the physical objects originally triggering these relations, and 
that are ‘maintained by their utility, coherence, and role in a social community’. This is not unlike institutions, 
which regulate behavior by defining the rules of human interaction. 
xiv http://paulromer.net/skyhooks-versus-cranes-the-nobel-prize-for-elinor-ostrom/ 
